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Abstract
In this paper, we study the egalitarian solution for games with
discrete side payment, where the characteristic function is integer-
valued and payoffs of players are integral vectors. The egalitarian
solution, introduced by Dutta and Ray in 1989, is a solution con-
cept for transferable utility cooperative games in characteristic form,
which combines commitment for egalitarianism and promotion of in-
divisual interests in a consistent manner. We first point out that the
nice properties of the egalitarian solution (in the continuous case) do
not extend to games with discrete side payment. Then we show that
the Lorenz stable set, which may be regarded a variant of the egal-
itarian solution, has nice properties such as the Davis and Maschler
reduced game property and the converse reduced game property. For
the proofs we utilize recent results in discrete convex analysis on de-
creasing minimization on an M-convex set investigated by Frank and
Murota.
1 Introduction
The egalitarian solution is a solution concept for transferable utility coop-
erative games in characteristic form which combines commitment for egali-
tarianism and promotion of indivisual interests in a consistent manner. This
concept was introduced by Dutta–Ray (1989) [11].
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The egalitarian solution is studied extensively in the literature. For exam-
ple, Arin et al. [2], Dutta [10], and Klijn et al. [22] axiomatise the egalitarian
solution of Dutta–Ray for convex games. Branzei et al. [6], Dietzenbacher et
al. [9], Hokari [18, 19], and Llerena–Mauri [26] considered modifications of
the egalitarian solution so that the solution exists for a wider class of games.
These studies are mostly concerned with the case where the characteristic
function is real-valued and, accordingly, the side payment is real-valued.
Substantial connection has been recognized between the egalitarian solu-
tion in convex games and the polymatroid theory in optimization. Indeed,
the core of a convex game is nothing but the base polyhedron of a polyma-
troid. In the theory of polymatroids and submodular functions, Fujishige
(1980) [16] had introduced the concept of lexicographically optimal base, and
this concept is essentially equivalent to the egalitarian solution in convex
games, as noted by Fujishige [17] and Hokari–Uchida [20]. In particular,
the principal partition of Fujishige [16] plays the decisive role to clarify the
properties of the egalitarian solution in convex games and also to develop
algorithms for finding it.
In this paper we are interested in the egalitarian solution for games with
discrete side payment, where the characteristic function is integer-valued and
payoffs of players are integral vectors. This study is partly motivated by a
recent development in discrete convex analysis, which is a theory of discrete
convexity for functions on integer lattice points (see [29, 30, 31, 32]). Frank–
Murota [14, 15] recently investigated the discrete decreasing minimization
problem, which is concerned with lexicographically minimal integral vectors
in an integral base polyhedron. This is a discrete counterpart of the work
by Fujishige [16], and, in particular, the discrete counterpart of the princi-
pal partition is established as the canonical partition. The main objective
of this paper is to clarify the properties of the egalitarian solution in games
with discrete side payment by making use of these results of lexicographi-
cally minimal (decreasingly minimal) integral elements in an integral base
polyhedron.
The results of this paper are summarized as follows. First, we show by an
example that, unlike the case of R, the egalitarian solution for convex games
with discrete side payment is not equivalent to the lexicographically mini-
mal (decreasingly minimal) element. Accordingly, the egalitarian solution in
the case of Z fails to have nice properties of the egalitarian solution in the
continuous case. This motivates us consider the Lorenz stable set (or equiv-
alently Lorenz maximal imputation). The Lorenz stable set is introduced
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by Arin–Inarra [1] and Hougaard et al. [21] and is defined as the subset of
the core consisting of the elements that are not Lorenz-dominated by any
other element of the core. We show that the Lorenz stable set has nice prop-
erties such as the Davis and Maschler reduced game property [8] and the
converse reduced game property [34]. Our analysis of the Lorenz stable set
relies heavily on the recent results on the discrete decreasing minimization
problem.
This paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 are brief reviews
on the egalitarian solution and discrete decreasing minimization problem,
respectively. In Section 4, we investigate the properties of the egalitarian
solution in games with discrete side payment in comparison with the egali-
tarian solution in continuous variables. In Sections 5 and 6, we clarify the
fundamental properties of the Lorenz stable set by utilizing the results on
discrete decreasing minimization.
2 Egalitarian solution in the continuous case
We provide a brief summary on the egalitarian solution of Dutta–Ray [11].
2.1 Definition and Notation
We consider a transferable utility game in characteristic function form. There
are n players and let N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. A coalition is a nonempty subset
of N , whereas N is called the grand coalition. The worth of a coalition S is
given by a scalar v(S). We assume v(∅) = 0 throughout this paper. A pair
(N, v) is called a game. We denote the set of games by Γ.
For a vector x ∈ RN , we sometimes abbreviate
∑N
i=1 xi to x(N). Let
(N, v) be a game. The set X(N, v) = {x ∈ RN+ | x(N) ≤ v(N)} is called
the set of feasible payoff vectors for the game (N, v). A solution on Γ is a
function σ which associates with each game (N, v) ∈ Γ a subset σ(N, v) of
X(N, v).
For a game (N, v), we call x an imputation if xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N
and x(N) = v(N). The restriction of N to S ⊆ N is denoted by xS. For two
vectors x, y ∈ RN , we write x > y if xi ≥ yi for all i = 1, . . . , n, with strict
inequality for some i. For a vector x, let x↓ denote the vector obtained from x
by rearranging its components in a decreasing order. The Lorenz-domination
is defined as follows:
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Definition 2.1. For two vectors x and y in RN with x(N) = y(N), we
say that x Lorenz-dominates y if
∑i
j=1(x↓)j ≤
∑i
j=1(y↓)j holds for all i =
1, . . . , n, with strict inequality for some i.
Also, for x, y ∈ RN , we say that x and y are value-equivalent if x↓ = y↓
holds.
Throughout this paper, we define the Lorenz-domination by a decreasing
order in accordance with Dutta–Ray [11]. Other papers, however, adopt an
increasing order as follows:
Definition 2.2. For a vector x, let x↑ denote the vector obtained from
x by rearranging its components in an increasing order. For two vectors
x and y in RN with x(N) = y(N), we say that x Lorenz-dominates y if∑i
j=1(x↑)j ≥
∑i
j=1(y↑)j for all i = 1, . . . , n, with strict inequality for some
i.
The decreasing order is adopted in Dutta [10], Dutta–Ray [11], Llerena
[24], and Llerena–Mauri [25], whereas the increasing order is in Arin–Inarra
[1], Arin et al. [3], Fei–Fields [13], Hokari [18, 19], Llerena–Mauri [26], and
Shaked–Shanthikumar [36]. We note that this difference in the definition
of Lorenz-domination does not affect the results of this paper; see Remark
5.2. We also mention that the Lorenz-domination is defined equivalently as
follows. For two payoff vectors x, y ∈ RN with x(N) = y(N),
x Lorenz-dominates y ⇔ Its Lorenz curve lies nowhere below that of y.
For example, Patrick [33] and Tatiana [38] adopt this definition.
Next, we define the core, which is a central solution concept of cooperative
game theory (cf., [35]).
Definition 2.3. For any coalition S, the core of S is defined by
C(S, v) = {x ∈ RS | x(S) = v(S), x(T ) ≥ v(T ) (∀T ( S)}.
Definition 2.4. We call a game (N, v) a convex game if v is a supermodular
function, that is,
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T )
for all S, T ⊆ N . We denote the set of convex games by Γc.
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The notion of the egalitarian solution will now be described. First, the
Lorenz mapE is defined on the domain {A | A ⊆ Rk (∃k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}), ∃u ∈
R, ∀x ∈ A :
∑k
i=1 xi = u}. For each such set A, E(A) denotes the set of all
elements in A that are not Lorenz-dominated within A.
Next, we define the Lorenz core introduced by Dutta–Ray [11]. See [11] for
the details about the Lorenz core. The Lorenz core is defined recursively as
follows. The Lorenz core of a singleton coalition is L({i}) = {v({i})} (i ∈ N).
Now suppose that the Lorenz cores for all coalitions of cardinality k − 1 or
less have been defined, where 2 ≤ k < n. The Lorenz core of coalitions of
size k is defined by
L(S, v) = {x ∈ RS | x(S) = v(S) and there is no T ( S and
y ∈ E(L(T, v)) such that xT < y}.
For a game (N, v) ∈ Γ, we call an element of E(L(N, v)) an egalitarian
solution. There is an inclusion between the core and the Lorenz core.
Proposition 2.1. For any S ⊆ N ,
C(S, v) ⊆ L(S, v). (1)
Proof. Assume that x /∈ L(S, v), which implies that y > xT for some T (
S (T 6= ∅) and some y ∈ E(L(T, v)). By this inequality and y(T ) = v(T ),
we obtain x(T ) < y(T ) = v(T ), which implies x /∈ C(S, v). Therefore, (1)
holds.
Remark 2.1. For the weighted egalitarian solution, see Hokari [19] and
Koster [23].
2.2 Properties of egalitarian solution
Here we describe the properties of the egalitarian solution shown by Dutta–
Ray [11]. First, the following theorem shows that the egalitarian solution is
unique if it exists at all.
Theorem 2.2. (Dutta–Ray [11]) There is at most one egalitarian solution
in any game.
Note that Theorem 2.2 does not guarantee the existence of the egalitarian
solution. The next theorem reveals that in any convex game, the egalitarian
solution always exists and belongs to the core.
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Theorem 2.3. (Dutta–Ray [11]) In convex games, an egalitarian solution
exists and it is contained in the core, that is, for any (N, v) ∈ Γc, we have
∅ 6= E(L(N, v)) ⊆ C(N, v).
Moreover, the egalitarian solution has a nice property as follows.
Theorem 2.4. (Dutta–Ray [11]) In convex games, the egalitarian solution
Lorenz-dominates every other element of the core.
Theorem 2.4 raises the question whether the egalitarian solution Lorenz-
dominates every other element of the Lorenz core. The following example
shows that this is not true even in convex games.
Example 2.1. (Dutta–Ray [11], Example 5) Let N = {1, 2, 3}, v({1}) =
4v({2}) = 6 v({3}) = 8v({1, 2}) = 11v({1, 3}) = 12 v({2, 3}) = 15 and
v(N) = 21. This game is convex. The egalitarian solution in this game is
(6, 7, 8), which does not Lorenz-dominate (6.25, 6.5, 8.25) ∈ L(N, v).
2.3 The algorithm for egalitarian solution in a convex
game
We describe an algorithm to locate the egalitarian solution introduced by
Dutta–Ray [11]. This algorithm is equivalent to the decomposition algorithm
of Fujishige [16].
Let v : 2N → R be a supermodular set function. Define v1 = v.
Step 1: Let S1 be the coalition that satisfies the following two conditions.
1. v1(S1)/|S1| ≥ v1(S)/|S| for all S ⊆ N .
2. |S1| > |S| for all S 6= S1 such that v1(S1)/|S1| = v1(S)/|S|.
That is, S1 is the largest coalition having the highest average worth. By
using supermodularity of v, we can verify the existence of such an S1. Define
x∗i =
v1(S1)
|S1|
(i ∈ S1).
Step k (k ≥ 2): Suppose that (S1, v1), . . . , (Sk−1, vk−1) (k ≥ 2) have been
defined and S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sk−1 6= N . Define a new game with player set N \
(S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sk−1). For all coalitions S of this new player set, define vk(S) by
vk(S) = vk−1(Sk−1 ∪ S)− vk−1(Sk−1).
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By the definition of vk, vk is a supermodular function. Just as in Step 1,
define Sk to be the largest coalition in N \ (S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sk−1) that maximizes
vk(S)
|S|
and define
x∗i =
vk(Sk)
|Sk|
(i ∈ Sk).
In at most n steps, we can obtain a partition ofN into sets S1, . . . , Sm (m ≤
n) and the egalitarian solution. By the above construction of x∗, we obtain
the following:
x∗i = x
∗
j (i, j ∈ Sl, l = 1, . . . , m), (2)
l∑
k=1
∑
j∈Sk
x∗j = v(S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sl) (l = 1, . . . , m), (3)
x∗i > x
∗
j (i ∈ Sk, j ∈ Sl, k < l). (4)
The equation (2) shows that for l = 1, . . . , m, each payoff of the players
belonging to Sl is the same.
3 Polymatroid theory and decreasing mini-
mization problem
In this section, we overview the results of the polymatroid theory and de-
creasing minimization problem from discrete convex analysis.
3.1 Definition and Notation
First, we give the basic facts about majorization and decreasing minimiza-
tion. A vector x is decreasingly smaller than vector y, in notation x <dec y,
if x↓ is lexicographically smaller than y↓ in the sense that they are not value-
equivalent and (x↓)j < (y↓)j for the smallest subscript j for which (x↓)j and
(y↓)j differ. We write x ≤dec y to mean that x is decreasingly smaller or
value-equivalent to y. For a set Q of vectors, x ∈ Q is decreasingly minimal
(dec-min, for short) in Q if x ≤dec y holds for every y ∈ Q.
The decreasing minimization problem is to find a dec-min element of a
given set Q of vectors. Frank–Murota [14, 15] deal with the case where the
set Q is an M-convex set, which is to be defined in Section 3.2.
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Just as the notion of decreasingly minimality, we can consider a notion of
increasingly maximality. A vector x is increasingly larger than vector y, in
notation x >inc y, if x↑ is lexicographically larger than y↑ in the sense that
they are not value-equivalent and (x↑)j > (y↑)j for the smallest subscript
j for which (x↑)j and (y↑)j differ. We write x ≥inc y to mean that x is
increasingly larger or value-equivalent to y. For a set Q of vectors, x ∈ Q
is increasingly maximal (inc-max, for short) in Q if x ≥inc y holds for every
y ∈ Q.
Let x denote the vector whose k-th component xk is equal to the sum of
the first k components of x↓. A vector x is said to be majorized by another
vector y, in notation x ≺ y, if x ≤ y and xn = yn hold. Also, x is said to be
strictly majorized by y if x < y and xn = yn hold [27]. Let Q be an arbitrary
subset of RN . An element x of Q is said to be least majorized in Q if x is
majorized by all y ∈ Q.
There exists a relationship between the notion of decreasing minimality
and that of being least majorized as follows.
Proposition 3.1. (e.g., Frank–Murota [15] and Tamir [37]) Let Q be an
arbitrary subset of RN and assume that Q admits a least majorized element.
Then, an element of Q is least majorized in Q if and only if it is decreasingly
minimal in Q.
Also, there exists a relationship between being majorized and Lorenz-
domination, that is,
x Lorenz-dominates y ⇔ x is strictly majorized by y.
Note that if we replace “strictly majorized” with “majorized” in the
above, then⇒ is true but⇐ is not true. Indeed, if xj = yj for all j = 1, . . . , n,
then x is majorized by y but x does not Lorenz-dominate y. However, if we
identify value-equivalent vectors, the notion of Lorenz-domination is equiva-
lent to that of being majorized.
3.2 Polymatroid theory and decreasing minimization
on an M-convex set
In polymatroid theory, the concept of base polyhedron plays a central role.
A base polyhedron is defined as follows.
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Definition 3.1. For a finite-valued supermodular set function g on N with
g(∅) = 0, the associated base polyhedron B(g) is defined by
B(g) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) = g(N), x(S) ≥ g(S) (∀S ( N)}.
If g is an integer-valued supermodular set function, we call B(g) an inte-
gral base polyhedron. Any extreme point of an integral base polyhedron is
an integer point and the convex hull of the integer points of B(g) coincides
with B(g) itself.
Lexicographically optimal base is defined as follows [16]:
Definition 3.2. For a supermodular function g : 2N → R, x ∈ B(g) is
said to be a lexicographically optimal base of B(g) if x ≥inc y holds for any
y ∈ B(g).
Remark 3.1. Fujishige [16] deals with the weighted lexicographically opti-
mal base. We mainly treat the unweighted lexicographically optimal base in
this paper.
Next, we define an M-concex set, which plays a central role in discrete
convex analysis. Here for two vectors x, y ∈ RN , we define
supp+(x− y) = {i ∈ N | xi > yi},
supp−(x− y) = {j ∈ N | xj < yj}
and for each i ∈ N , let characteristic vector χi ∈ {0, 1}
N denote by
χi(j) =
{
1 (i = j),
0 (i 6= j).
Then, the concept of M-convex set is defined as follows.
Definition 3.3. (M-convex set, Murota [28, 29, 30]) We say that the set
B ⊆ ZN is an M-convex set if for any x, y ∈ B and for any i ∈ supp+(x− y),
there exists some j ∈ supp−(x− y):
x− χi + χj ∈ B, y + χi − χj ∈ B.
A set B ⊆ ZN is an M-convex set if and only if B = B(g)∩ZN holds for
some integer-valued supermodular function g. That is, an M-convex set is
nothing but the set of integral points of an integral base polyhedron.
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Decreasingly minimal elements on an M-convex set can be regarded as a
discrete counterpart of the lexicographically optimal base. We note that for
any M-convex set B, an element is decreasingly minimal in B if and only if
it is increasingly maximal in B (cf., [15, 37]). Frank–Murota [14, 15] mainly
consider the problem of finding a dec-min element of an M-convex set.
M-convex set is characterized by the exchange axiom of Definition 3.3.
Similarly, a dec-min element of an M-convex set is characterized by certain
exchange operations as follows.
Definition 3.4. (1-tightening step [14, 15]) Let B ⊆ ZN be an M-convex
set. A 1-tightening step for x ∈ B means the operation of replacing x to
x+ χi− χj for some i, j ∈ N such that xj ≥ xi + 2 and x+χi− χj ∈ B.
Theorem 3.2. (Frank–Murota [14], Theorem 3.3) Let B be an M-convex
set. For an element x of B, the following equivalence holds:
There is no 1-tightening step for x ⇔ x is decreasingly minimal in B.
Remark 3.2. A 1-tightening step is called the Robin Hood transfer or Robin
Hood operation in economics and the theory of majorization (see also Arnold
[4] and Marshall et al. [27]). Also, a 1-tightening step is called the progressive
transfer or rich to poor transfer in Dutta–Ray [11]. Note that they do not
restrict B to an M-convex set in Definition 3.4.
Finally, we explain the relationship between an M-convex set and a least
majorized element. The following theorem shows the existence of a least
majorized element in an M-convex set.
Theorem 3.3. (e.g., [15, 37]) An M-convex set admits a least majorized
element.
Remark 3.3. According to Frank–Murota [15], the above fact has long been
recognized by experts at least since 1995, though it was difficult to identify
its origin in the literature.
3.3 Structure of dec-min elements on an M-convex set
In this section, we introduce a partition and a chain called canonical parti-
tion and canonical chain respectively that describe the structure of dec-min
elements on an M-convex set. They are introduced by Frank–Murota [14, 15]
10
and the canonical partition is a discrete counterpart of the principal parti-
tion considered by Fujishige [16] for the lexicographically optimal base in
continuous variables.
The canonical chain and the canonical partition of an M-convex set are
constructed as follows [14, 15]. Let g : 2N → Z be an integer-valued super-
modular function with g(∅) = 0 and g(N) > −∞. Consider the smallest
maximizer L(β) of g(X) − β|X| for all integers β. There are finitely many
β for which L(β) 6= L(β − 1). Denote such integers as β1 > β2 > · · · > βq
and call the essential value-sequence. Furthermore, define Ck = L(βk − 1)
for k = 1, 2, . . . , q to obtain a chain: C1 ( C2 ( C2 ( · · · ( Cq. Call
this the canonical chain. Finally define a partition {S1, S2, . . . , Sq} of N by
Sk = Ck \ Ck−1 for k = 1, 2, . . . , q, where C0 = ∅, and call this the canonical
partition.
Alternatively, the canonical chain and the canonical partition can be de-
fined iteratively as follows. For k = 1, 2, . . . , q, define
βk = max
{⌈
g(X ∪ Ck−1)− g(Ck−1)
|X|
⌉
| ∅ 6= X ⊆ Ck−1
}
,
hk(X) = g(X ∪ Ck−1)− (βk − 1)|X| − g(Ck−1) (X ⊆ Ck−1),
Sk = smallest subset of Ck−1 maximizing hk,
Ck = Ck−1 ∪ Sk,
where Ck−1 = N \ Ck−1.
Then, this chain enables us to construct the set of dec-min elements on an
M-convex set as follows. We define the supermodular function g′k : 2
Ck → Z
g′k(X) = g(X ∪ Ck)− g(Ck) (X ⊆ Ck)
which defines the M-convex set B′k = B
′(g′k) in R
Ck .
Moreover, we denote the restriction of g′k to Sk by gk which defines the
M-convex set Bk = B
′(gk) ⊆ R
Sk for each k = 1, . . . , q. Let B⊕ denote the
face of B(g) defined by the canonical chain C∗ = {C1, . . . , Cq}, that is, B
⊕
is the direct sum of the M-convex sets Bk (k = 1, . . . , q). We note that B
⊕
is an M-convex set because the direct sum of M-convex sets is an M-convex
set (cf., [30]).
We define Tk (k = 1, . . . , q) and T
⊕, which is the direct sum of Tk (k =
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1, . . . , q), by using the essential value-sequence as follows:
Tk = {x ∈ Z
Sk | βk − 1 ≤ xi ≤ βk (i ∈ Sk)},
T⊕ = {x ∈ ZN | βk − 1 ≤ xi ≤ βk (i ∈ Sk), k = 1, . . . , q}.
The intersection of an M-convex set with an integral box is always an M-
convex set, and hence B⊕ ∩ T⊕ is an M-convex set. The following theorem
shows that the set of dec-min elements of an M-convex set forms an M-convex
set and is characterized by the canonical partition.
Theorem 3.4. (Frank–Murota [14], Theorem 5.1) The set of decreasingly
minimal elements of B(g) is B⊕ ∩ T⊕. That is, an element x ∈ B(g) is
decreasingly minimal in B(g) if and only if xSk ∈ Bk ∩ Tk holds for each
k = 1, . . . , q.
This theorem also implies that for every dec-min element x of B(g), we
have
xi ∈ {βk − 1, βk} (i ∈ Sk). (5)
4 Egalitarian solution in the discrete case
In this section, we investigate the properties of the egalitarian solution in
Case Z in comparison with the case R.
4.1 Preliminaries on the egalitarian solution in the dis-
crete case
We first define a game with discrete side payment. A game with discrete
side payment will mean a game (N, v), where the characteristic function v
is integer-valued and payoffs of players are integral vectors. We call a game
with discrete side payment a discrete game for short and denote the set of
discrete games by ΓZ. Also, we say that a discrete game is a discrete convex
game when its characteristic function is supermodular. We denote the set
of discrete convex games by Γc
Z
. For clarity, we denote the set of games in
continuous variables and the set of convex games in continuous variables by
ΓR and Γ
c
R
, respectively.
We define the egalitarian solution in discrete games by simply replacing
R with Z in the definitions of Section 2. Specifically, it is defined as follows.
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For a discrete game (N, v) ∈ ΓZ, the Lorenz core of a singleton coalition is
L({i}) = {v({i})} (i ∈ N). We note that since v is integer-valued, L({i})
is a set of an integral vector for each i ∈ N . Now suppose that the Lorenz
cores for all coalitions of cardinality k − 1 or less have been defined, where
2 ≤ k < n. The Lorenz core of coalitions S of size k is defined by
L(S, v) = {x ∈ ZS | x(S) = v(S) and there is no T ( S and
y ∈ E(L(T, v)) such that xT < y}.
By the definition, L(S, v) is composed of integral vectors for each S ⊆ N .
Then, analogous to the Case R, we call an element of E(L(N, v)) an
egalitarian solution for the discrete game (N, v) ∈ ΓZ, where E(L(N, v)) is
a subset of the Lorenz core L(N, v) that are not Lorenz-dominated by any
other element of the Lorenz core.
The main properties of the egalitarian solution in Case R are as follows:
Property 1 There is at most one egalitarian solution in any game. (Unique-
ness)
Property 2 In convex games, there exists an egalitarian solution and it is in
the core.
Property 3 In convex games, the egalitarian solution Lorenz-dominates every
other element of the core.
We will investigate whether the egalitarian solution in the discrete cases
has these properties. In this section, we show the following:
• In discrete games, there may exist multiple egalitarian solutions (Ex-
ample 4.1).
• In discrete convex games, there exists at least one egalitarian solution
(Theorem 4.4).
• In discrete convex games, there may exist an egalitarian solution out-
side the core (Example 4.2).
• In discrete convex games, every element of egalitarian solutions in the
core, if any, Lorenz-dominates every element of the core that is not an
egalitarian solution (Theorem 4.3). In addition, the egalitarian solu-
tions outside the core do not necessarily Lorenz-dominate every element
of the core that is not an egalitarian solution (Example 4.2).
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4.2 Relationship between the egalitarian solution and
polymatroid theory
In this subsection, we describe the connection between the egalitarian solu-
tion in convex games and the polymatroid theory.
First, it is obvious from the definitions that if (N, v) is a convex game,
then the core C(N, v) coincides with the base polyhedron. Then, there is the
following relationship between the lexicographically optimal base and the
egalitarian solution.
Theorem 4.1. ([17, 20]) In convex games Γc
R
, the lexicographically optimal
base is equivalent to the egalitarian solution.
On the other hand, as is shown in Section 4.3, the lexicographically opti-
mal base (decreasingly minimal element) is not equivalent to the egalitarian
solution in discrete convex games.
Next, we investigate the relationship between the core and an M-convex
set. For a game (N, v), if v is an integer-valued supermodular function, then
the core of the game is an integral base polyhedron. Since an M-convex set
is the set of integral members of an integral base polyhedron, the core of a
discrete convex game is an M-convex set. Therefore, the following property
holds in discrete convex games by Theorem 3.3.
Proposition 4.2. In discrete convex games Γc
Z
, the core admits a least ma-
jorized element.
4.3 Properties of the egalitarian solution in Case Z
We first consider the Property 1. Example 4.1 below shows that there can
exist multiple egalitarian solutions in Case Z. That is, the Property 1 does
not hold in Case Z.
Example 4.1. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, v({i}) = 0 (i ∈ N), v({1, 2}) = v({1, 3}) =
v(N) = 1, and v({2, 3}) = 0. The egalitarian solutions are E(L(N, v)) =
{(1, 0), (0, 1)}, which implies the non-uniqueness of the egalitarian solution
in Case Z.
Next, we consider the Property 2. The non-uniqueness of the egalitarian
solution in discrete games suggests two separate problems in Case Z. The
first question is whether there exists at least one egalitarian solution for any
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discrete convex game. The second is what is the relationship between the
core and the egalitarian solution.
We first consider the existence of the egalitarian solution in discrete con-
vex games. The following fundamental result is a key property in this paper.
Theorem 4.3. For any discrete convex game (N, v) ∈ Γc
Z
, there exists some
x ∈ C(N, v) that Lorenz-dominates any y ∈ C(N, v) with y↓ 6= x↓.
Theorem 4.3 is derived from Proposition 4.2 as follows. Proposition 4.2
and the fact that the core in discrete convex games is an M-convex set imply
that there exists a least majorized element in the core. By these facts and
the relationship between being majorized and Lorenz-domination as seen in
Section 3.1, we obtain that for any discrete convex game, there exists an
element of the core that Lorenz-dominates every element of the core not
value-equivalent to the element.
Next, we show the existence of the egalitarian solution in any discrete con-
vex game. Note that the following theorem does not state that all egalitarian
solutions are contained in the core.
Theorem 4.4. In discrete convex games, there exists an egalitarian solution,
that is, for any (N, v) ∈ Γc
Z
, E(L(N, v)) 6= ∅ holds.
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that E(L(N, v)) = ∅. Take any x ∈ C(N, v)
in Theorem 4.3. If there is no element of the Lorenz core that Lorenz-
dominates x, then x ∈ E(L(N, v)) holds, which contradicts the assumption
that E(L(N, v)) = ∅. Therefore there exists some y ∈ L(N, v) that Lorenz-
dominates x. Here we obtain y /∈ C(N, v), since otherwise x is Lorenz-
dominated by the core element y, which contradicts the fact that x is not
Lorenz-dominated by any element of the core by Theorem 4.3. Thus we have
y ∈ L(N, v) \ C(N, v). Note that y 6= x.
Then, E(L(N, v)) = ∅ shows that y /∈ E(L(N, v)). Hence there exists
some y1 ∈ L(N, v) that Lorenz-dominates y. By the above argument, we have
y1 /∈ C(N, v) and y1 6= y. Moreover, y1 6= x holds since if y1 Lorenz-dominates
y, then y1 Lorenz-dominates x. By repeating the above arguments, we arrive
at the Lorenz core element yk that is not Lorenz-dominated by any element of
L(N, v) because L(N, v) is bounded. Note that y, y1, . . . , yk, x are all distinct.
However, this contradicts the assumption that E(L(N, v)) = ∅.
Remark 4.1. By the proof of Theorem 4.4, we obtain that for any discrete
convex game (N, v) ∈ Γc
Z
and for each y ∈ L(N, v) \E(L(N, v)), there exists
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an x ∈ E(L(N, v)) that Lorenz-dominates y. Llerena–Mauri [26] calls this
property the external Lorenz stability.
Next, we consider the relationship between the core and the egalitarian
solution in Case Z. In Case R, the egalitarian solution always belongs to the
core for any convex game. The following example reveals that, in Case Z,
there can exist an egalitarian solution outside the core even in convex games.
Example 4.2. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and define v as in the following table. This
example is based on Example 5 in Dutta–Ray [11].
Table 1: Values of v and egalitarian solutions in Example 4.2
S v(S) EL(S, v)
{1} 40 {40}
{2} 60 {60}
{3} 80 {80}
{1,2} 110 {(50,60)}
{1,3} 120 {(40,80)}
{2,3} 150 {(70,80)}
{1,2,3} 210 {(60,70,80), (64,65,81), (65,64,81)}
This game is convex and (60, 70, 80) ∈ E(L(N, v)) is in the core. How-
ever, (64, 65, 81) and (65, 64, 81) ∈ E(L(N, v)) are not contained in the core
because for each vector, the sum of its second and third components is as
follows respectively.
65 + 81 = 146 < 150 = v({2, 3}), 64 + 81 = 145 < 150 = v({2, 3}).
Example 4.2 poses the question whether there always exists an egalitarian
solution in the core. However, this question remains unsolved in this paper.
As mentioned in Theorem 4.1, in convex games, lexicographically optimal
base and the egalitarian solution are equivalent in Case R. However, the fact
that not all egalitarian solutions belong to the core even in discrete convex
games shows that, the set of egalitarian solutions do not necessarily coincide
with the set of dec-min elements in an M-convex set in Case Z.
Finally, we consider the Property 3. In discrete convex games, we have
to consider two problems. (a) Whether every egalitarian solution Lorenz-
dominates every element of the core that is not an egalitarian solution, (b)
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whether all egalitarian solutions satisfying (a) Lorenz-dominate every other
element of the Lorenz core.
We first demonstrate that the egalitarian solutions outside the core do
not satisfy the Property 3 and then we reveal that egalitarian solutions of
the core have this property.
We consider Example 4.2 again. The egalitarian solutions in the core of
the game of Example 4.2 are (64, 65, 81) and (65, 64, 81) (Table 1) and we
take (64, 65, 81) ∈ E(L(N, v)). For example, vector (59, 71, 80) is in the core.
Since its largest component 80 is smaller than that of (64, 65, 81), (64, 65, 81)
does not Lorenz-dominate (59, 71, 80). Note that (59, 71, 80) /∈ E(L(N, v))
because (60, 70, 80) Lorenz-dominates (59, 71, 80). Thus, in discrete con-
vex games, egalitarian solutions outside the core do not necessarily Lorenz-
dominate every element of the core except for the egalitarian solution. This
is the distinction of the case R and Z.
We next consider the egalitarian solutions in the core. Since all least
majorized elements in the core Lorenz-dominate every element of the core
that is not a least majorized element, the set of the egalitarian solutions in
the core coincides with the set of the least majorized elements in the core.
Therefore, in discrete convex games, the Property 3 holds for the egalitarian
solutions in the core.
In contrast, the Property 3 does not hold for the elements of the Lorenz
core as follows. For the game of Example 4.2, the egalitarian solution
(60, 70, 80) ∈ E(L(N, v)) does not Lorenz-dominate (64, 64, 82) ∈ L(N, v) \
E(L(N, v)). Recall that (60, 70, 80) ∈ C(N, v). This fact shows that the
egalitarian solutions of the core do not necessarily Lorenz-dominate every
element of the Lorenz core that are not contained in E(L(N, v)).
5 Reduced game property
By Example 4.2, we see that there can exist an egalitarian solution outside
the core even in discrete convex games. Therefore, in Case Z, the egalitarian
solution and the dec-min element of the core are not equivalent. Also, we
do not know about the existence of the egalitarian solution of the core in
discrete convex games.
Thus, we are motivated to consider the Lorenz stable set introduced by
Arin–Inarra [1] and Hougaard et al. [21], a subset of the core consisting of the
elements that are not Lorenz-dominated by any other element of the core.
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Their approach is based on the fact that the core is considered to be the
set of natural stable allocations. For example, in a class of cost and surplus
sharing games, the core plays a crucial role (see e.g., [35]). In particular, this
class is contained in a class of games arising from combinatorial optimization
problems including the polymatroid theory, where the core also plays a cen-
tral role (cf., [7, 21, 35]). We follow their approach and show that the Lorenz
stable set in discrete convex games has nice properties such as the Davis and
Maschler reduced game property and the converse reduced game property in
Sections 5 and 6.
Dutta [10] has already shown that the egalitarian solution in convex games
in continuous variables has these nice properties. He derives these results by
making use of the properties of the principal partition explained in Section
2.3. The point in our study is that we can give the proofs of these properties
by utilizing the canonical partition and the canonical chain due to Frank–
Murota [14, 15].
The results of Sections 5 and 6 are summarized as follows.
1. In discrete convex games, the Lorenz stable set is nonempty, and every
element of it Lorenz-dominates every element of the core not contained
in the Lorenz stable set (Theorems 5.1 and 5.2).
2. In discrete convex games, the Lorenz stable set has the Davis and
Maschler reduced game property and the converse reduced game prop-
erty (Theorems 5.6 and 6.2).
5.1 Lorenz stable set
Fisrt, we give the definition of the Lorenz stable set.
Definition 5.1. (Lorenz stable set [1, 21]) For a game (N, v) ∈ ΓR, the
Lorenz stable set LSS(N, v) is defined as follows:
LSS(N, v) = {x ∈ C(N, v) | ∄ y ∈ C(N, v) : y Lorenz-dominates x}. (6)
We define the Lorenz stable set in discrete games by replacing ΓR with
ΓZ in the above definition.
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Remark 5.1. Hougaard et al. (2001) [21] introduced the notion of the
Lorenz maximal imputation, whose definition is exactly same as the Lorenz
stable set. In this paper, we use “Lorenz stable set” following Arin–Inarra
(2001) [1].
The Lorenz stable set is contained in the core by its definition. That is,
LSS(N, v) ⊆ C(N, v) (7)
holds for each game (N, v) ∈ Γ regardless of the case R and Z.
The following properties hold for the Lorenz stable set.
Theorem 5.1. For any discrete convex game, the Lorenz stable set is nonempty.
Theorem 5.2. For any discrete convex game (N, v) ∈ Γc
Z
, if x ∈ LSS(N, v),
then x Lorenz-dominates every element of the core except for the elements
value-equivalent to x.
Theorem 5.2 shows that the Lorenz stable set has the Property 3. This
is one of the reasons that we consider the Lorenz stable set instead of the
egalitarian solution in Case Z.
5.2 Davis and Maschler reduced game property
In this subsection, we consider the Davis and Maschler reduced game prop-
erty of the Lorenz stable set by using the properties of the canonical chain
and the canonical partition describing the structures of dec-min elements of
an M-convex set.
We first show that for every discrete convex game, the Lorenz stable set
coincides with the set of dec-min elements of the core. This enables us to
apply the results of Frank–Murota [14, 15] to the study of the Lorenz stable
set.
Proposition 5.3. In discrete convex games, the Lorenz stable set coincides
with the set of dec-min elements in the core.
Proof. Note first that since every least majorized element of the core Lorenz-
dominates every element of the core that is not a least majorized element,
the Lorenz stable set coincides with the set of the least majorized elements of
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the core (see also Definition 5.1). The existence of a least majorized element
of the core is guaranteed by Proposition 4.2. Since if the core admits a least
majorized element, then an element is the least majorized in the core if and
only if it is a dec-min element in the core by Proposition 3.1, the Lorenz
stable set coincides with the set of dec-min elements of the core.
Remark 5.2. As noted in Section 2.1, even when we define the notion of
Lorenz-domination in an increasing order, its change does not affect the
results of Sections 5 and 6. This is justified by the following property (e.g.,
Frank–Murota [15] and Tamir [37]). Let Q be an arbitrary subset of RN
and assume that Q admits a least majorized element. For any x ∈ Q the
following three conditions are equivalent.
(A) x is least majorized in Q.
(B) x is decreasingly minimal in Q.
(C) x is increasingly maximal in Q.
Since, in discrete convex games, the Lorenz stable set coincides with the set of
dec-min elements of the core by Proposition 5.3, the equivalence between (B)
and (C) implies that the Lorenz stable set coincides with the set of inc-max
elements of the core.
Next we define the reduced game and the Davis and Maschler reduced
game property.
Definition 5.2. (Reduced game (Davis–Maschler [8])) Let (N, v) ∈ ΓR be
a game, S ( N , and x ∈ RN be a payoff vector. The reduced game with
respect to S and x is the game (S, vxS) where
vxS(T ) =


0 (T = ∅),
v(N)− x(N \ S) (T = S),
maxQ⊆N\S{v(T ∪Q)− x(Q)} (T ( S).
(8)
Definition 5.3. (Davis and Maschler reduced game property [8]) Let σ be
a solution over a class ΓR of games. Then σ is said to have the Davis and
Maschler reduced game property over ΓR, when for all (N, v) ∈ ΓR, for all
x ∈ σ(N, v), and for all S ( N , (S, vxS) ∈ ΓR and xS ∈ σ(S, v
x
S) hold.
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We define the reduced game and the Davis and Maschler reduced game
property in Case Z by replacing R with Z in the above definitions.
Dutta [10] shows the following fact in Case R. This also holds for any
discrete convex game. For completeness, we give the proof.
Lemma 5.4. For any discrete convex game (N, v) ∈ Γc
Z
, for all S ⊆ N , and
for all y ∈ LSS(N, v), (S, vyS) is a discrete convex game.
Proof. For any Ti ⊆ S (i = 1, 2), there exists some Ri ⊆ N \ S such that
vyS(Ti) = max{v(Ti ∪ R)− y(R) | R ⊆ N \ S} = v(Ti ∪ Ri)− y(Ri).
By using the supermodularity of v, we have
vyS(T1) + v
y
S(T2)
= v(T1 ∪ R1)− y(R1) + v(T2 ∪R2)− y(R2)
= v(T1 ∪ R1) + v(T2 ∪ R2)− y(R1 ∪ R2)− y(R1 ∩R2)
≤ v((T1 ∪ R1) ∪ (T2 ∪R2)) + v((T1 ∪ R1) ∩ (T2 ∪R2))− y(R1 ∪R2)− y(R1 ∩ R2)
= v((T1 ∪ T2) ∪ (R1 ∪R2))− y(R1 ∪R2) + v((T1 ∩ T2) ∪ (R1 ∩ R2))− y(R1 ∩R2)
≤ max{v((T1 ∪ T2) ∪Q)− y(Q) | Q ⊆ N \ S}
+max{v((T1 ∩ T2) ∪Q)− y(Q) | Q ⊆ N \ S}
= vyS(T1 ∪ T2) + v
y
S(T1 ∩ T2),
which shows the supermodularity of vyS.
Peleg [34] has already shown the Davis and Maschler reduced game prop-
erty of the core in Case R. This also holds for any discrete game. Its proof is
exactly same as that of Peleg, but, we give the proof for the sake of complete-
ness. Note that we do not assume the convexity of games in the following
theorem.
Theorem 5.5. The core has the Davis and Maschler reduced game property
for any discrete game. That is, for all (N, v) ∈ ΓZ, for all x ∈ LSS(N, v),
and for all S ( N , (S, vxS) ∈ ΓZ and xS ∈ LSS(S, v
x
S) hold.
Proof. Take any x ∈ C(N, v) and S ⊆ N (S 6= ∅). We want to show that
xS ∈ C(S, v
x
S). First we note that x(S) = v
x
S(S). Indeed, if T = S, then
using x(N) = v(N), we have vxS(T ) − x(T ) = v(N) − x(N \ S) − x(S) =
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v(N) − x(N) = 0, which shows that x(S) = vxS(S). If T ( S, then the
following inequality holds.
vxS(T )− x(T ) = max{v(T ∪Q)− x(Q) | Q ⊆ N \ S} − x(T )
= max{v(T ∪Q)− x(T ∪Q) | Q ⊆ N \ S}
≤ 0.
This inequality implies that x(T ) ≥ vxS(T ) for any T ( S. Therefore we
obtain xS ∈ C(S, v
x
S).
Here we show the Davis and Maschler reduced game property of the
Lorenz stable set in discrete convex games. We emphasize that the proof of
the following theorem relies heavily on the properties of the canonical chain
and the canonical partition.
Theorem 5.6. For any discrete convex game (N, v) ∈ Γc
Z
, the Lorenz stable
set has the Davis and Maschler reduced game property. That is, if x ∈
LSS(N, v), then xS ∈ LSS(S, v
x
S) holds for all S ⊆ N (S 6= ∅).
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that for some y ∈ LSS(N, v) and for some
T ( N (T 6= ∅), yT is Lorenz-dominated by some x ∈ LSS(T, v
y
T ). Note that
x ∈ C(T, vyT ) by (7). Then, we can prove the following claim, which is proved
later.
Claim 1.
∃k ∈ {1, . . . , q} :
∑
i∈T∩Ck
yi >
∑
i∈T∩Ck
xi, (9)
where {C1, . . . , Cq} is the canonical chain for N constructed by the iterative
procedure in Section 3.2.
For k in Claim 1, let R = T ∩ Ck and Rk = Ck \ T . Then, we have
v(Rk ∪R) = v(Ck) =
∑
i∈Ck
yi. (10)
The second equality follows from y(Ck) = v(Ck) for each k = 1, . . . , q (cf.,
Theorem 3.4). By the definition of vyT , (10) and the inequality of Claim 1,
we obtain
vyT (R) = max{v(Q ∪ R)− y(Q) | Q ⊆ N \ T} ≥ v(R ∪ Rk)−
∑
i∈Rk
yi
=
∑
i∈R
yi >
∑
i∈R
xi,
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which contradicts x ∈ LSS(T, vyT ) ⊆ C(T, v
y
T ) (see also (7)).
We now prove Claim 1. Assume, to the contrary, that
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , q} :
∑
i∈T∩Ck
yi ≤
∑
i∈T∩Ck
xi. (11)
Under this assumption, we will show the value-equivalence of x and yT on T ,
which contradicts the assumption that x Lorenz-dominates yT . Then we are
done.
First, we show that x and yT are value-equivalent on T ∩ C1. We may
assume that T ∩ C1 6= ∅. By Theorem 3.4 and (5), yj = β1 or yj = β1 − 1
holds for all j ∈ T ∩ C1. Two cases are to be distinguished.
(1) The case where yj = β1 for all j ∈ T ∩C1. Since x Lorenz-dominates yT ,
we have xj ≤ β1 for all j ∈ T ∩ C1. Then, this fact and (11) show that
xj = β1 holds for all j ∈ T ∩C1. Therefore, x and yT are value-equivalent
on T ∩ C1.
(2) The case where yj = β1 − 1 for some j ∈ T ∩ C1. We show that∑
i∈T∩C1
yi =
∑
i∈T∩C1
xi. (12)
Assume that
∑
i∈T∩C1
yi <
∑
i∈T∩C1
xi holds. Then, since x Lorenz-
dominates yT , xj ≤ β1 holds for all j ∈ T ∩ C1. Hence, this inequality
implies that the number of β1-valued components of yT is strictly smaller
than that of x (see Figure 1), which contradicts the assumption that x
Lorenz-dominates yT . Therefore, we have (12). This equation, together
with the facts that xi ≤ β1 holds for all i ∈ T ∩C1 and either yi = β1 or
yi = β1 − 1 holds, shows that x and yT are value-equivalent on T ∩ C1.
Since x and y are value-equivalent on T ∩ C1 as above, (11) implies the
following: ∑
i∈T∩(C2\C1)
yi ≤
∑
i∈T∩(C2\C1)
xi. (13)
Next, we show the value-equivalence between x and yT on T ∩C2, that is,
x and yT are value-equivalent on T ∩ (C2 \C1). Note first that either yj = β2
or yj = β2 − 1 holds for all j ∈ T ∩ (C2 \ C1) by Theorem 3.4 and (5).
23
x :
r︷ ︸︸ ︷
β1 = · · · = β1 = β1 >
|T∩C1|−r︷ ︸︸ ︷
β1 − 1 = · · · = β1 − 1
y :
at most r−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
β1 = · · · = β1 > β1 − 1 ≥ . . .
Figure 1: Values of x and y on T ∩ C1
(1) The case where yj = β2 for all j ∈ T ∩ (C2 \ C1). Then, since x and yT
are value-equivalent on T ∩ C1 and x Lorenz-dominates yT , we obtain
xj ≤ β2 (∀j ∈ T ∩ (C2 \C1)). This statement and (13) show that xj = β2
holds for all j ∈ T ∩ (C2 \ C1), which implies that x and yT are value-
equivalent on T ∩ (C2 \ C1).
(2) The case where yk = β2 − 1 for some k ∈ T ∩ (C2 \ C1). We will first
show that
∑
i∈T∩(C2\C1)
yi =
∑
i∈T∩(C2\C1)
xi holds. Assume that
∑
i∈T∩(C2\C1)
yi <
∑
i∈T∩(C2\C1)
xi. (14)
By the facts that yj is either β2 or β2 − 1 for any j ∈ T ∩ (C2 \ C1), x
Lorenz-dominates yT , and x and yT are value-equivalent on T ∩ C1, we
have xj ≤ β2 for all j ∈ T ∩ (C2 \C1). Therefore, if (14) is true, then the
number of β2-valued components of yT is strictly smaller than that of x
on T ∩ (C2 \ C1) (see Figure 2), which contradicts the assumption that
x Lorenz-dominates yT together, since x and yT are value-equivalent on
T ∩ C1.
From the above arguments, we obtain that
∑
i∈T∩C2
yi =
∑
i∈T∩C2
xi and
x and yT are value-equivalent on T ∩ C2. By repeating this argument until
k = q, we have that x and yT are value-equivalent on T . Thus the proof of
Claim 1 is completed.
Remark 5.3. Here, we demonstrate that the egalitarian solution in discrete
variables fails to have the Davis and Maschler reduced game property even in
discrete convex games. We reconsider the game of Example 4.2. The value
of vxS and the set of egalitarian solutions of the reduced game with respect
to S = {2, 3} and x = (64, 65, 81) ∈ E(L(N, v)) are given as in Table 2.
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x :
T∩C1︷ ︸︸ ︷
r1︷ ︸︸ ︷
β1 = · · · = β1 >
|T∩C1|−r1︷ ︸︸ ︷
β1 − 1 = · · · = β1 − 1 ≥
T∩(C2\C1)︷ ︸︸ ︷
r2︷ ︸︸ ︷
β2 = · · · = β2 = β2 > β2 − 1 = · · · = β2 − 1
y :
T∩C1︷ ︸︸ ︷
r1︷ ︸︸ ︷
β1 = · · · = β1 >
|T∩C1|−r1︷ ︸︸ ︷
β1 − 1 = · · · = β1 − 1 ≥
T∩(C2\C1)︷ ︸︸ ︷
at most r2−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
β2 = · · · = β2 > β2 − 1 ≥ . . .
Figure 2: Values of x and y on T ∩ C2
Table 2: Values of vxS and the egalitarian solution of (S, v
x
S)
T vxS(T ) EL(T, v
x
S)
{2} 60 {60}
{3} 80 {80}
{2,3} 146 {(66,80)}
The values of vxS are calculated as follows:
vxS({2}) = max{v({2}), v({1, 2})− x1} = max{60, 110− 64} = 60,
vxS({3}) = max{v({3}), v({1, 3})− x1} = max{80, 120− 64} = 80,
vxS({2, 3}) = v({1, 2, 3})− x1 = 210− 64 = 146.
Then, we obtain xS = (65, 81) /∈ EL(S, v
x
S), which shows that the egalitarian
solutions outside the core fail to have the Davis and Maschler reduced game
property even in discrete convex games.
6 Converse reduced game property
In this section, we consider the converse reduced game property of the Lorenz
stable set in discrete convex games. Peleg [34] defines the converse reduced
game property as follows.
Definition 6.1. (Converse reduced game property (Peleg [34])) Let σ be
a solution on ΓR. A solution σ is said to have the converse reduced game
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property if the following condition is satisfied: For x ∈ RN with x(N) = v(N),
if (N, v) ∈ ΓR and xS ∈ σ(S, v
x
S) for every S ⊆ N with |S| = 2, then
x ∈ σ(N, v) holds.
We define the converse reduced game property in Case Z by replacing R
with Z in the above definition.
Peleg [34] has already shown the converse reduced game property of the
core. This is also true for any discrete game. Its proof is exactly same as
that of Peleg, but, we give the proof for the sake of completeness. Note that
we do not assume the convexity of games in the following lemma.
Lemma 6.1. For any discrete game (N, v) ∈ ΓZ, the core satisfies the con-
verse reduced game property.
Proof. For a discrete game (N, v) ∈ ΓZ, let x ∈ Z
N be a vector satisfying
x(N) = v(N) and xS ∈ σ(S, v
x
S) for every S with |S| = 2. Take any T (
N (T 6= ∅), i ∈ T , and j ∈ N \ T . Let Q = {i, j}. Then, by using
xQ ∈ C(Q, v
x
Q), we obtain the following inequalities:
0 ≥ vxQ({i})− xi ≥ v((T \ {i, j}) ∪ {i})− x(T \ {i, j})− xi
= v(T )− x(T ),
where the equality is due to j /∈ T . Therefore, x(T ) ≥ v(T ) holds for every
T ( N . Also, we have x(N) = v(N) by the hypothesis of x. Thus, we obtain
x ∈ C(N, v).
6.1 Converse reduced game property in Case Z
In this subsection, we prove the converse reduced game property of the Lorenz
stable set in Case Z.
Theorem 6.2. For any discrete convex game (N, v) ∈ Γc
Z
, the Lorenz stable
set has the converse reduced game property, that is, for x ∈ ZN with x(N) =
v(N), if (N, v) ∈ Γc
Z
and xS ∈ LSS(S, v
x
S) for every S ⊆ N with |S| = 2,
then x ∈ LSS(N, v) holds.
Proof. Note first that x ∈ C(N, v) by Lemma 6.1. Suppose that x /∈
LSS(N, v). Since the Lorenz stable set coincides with the set of dec-min ele-
ments of C(N, v) by Proposition 5.3, x is not a dec-min element of C(N, v).
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Therefore, by Theorem 3.2, there is a 1-tightening step for x, that is, there ex-
ist some i, j ∈ N such that xj ≥ xi+2 and x
′ = x+χi−χj ∈ C(N, v). Since
the core satisfies the Davis–Maschler reduced game property by Theorem
5.5, we have x′{i,j} ∈ C({i, j}, v
x′
{i,j}). Note that x{i,j} ∈ LSS({i, j}, v
x
{i,j}) ⊆
C({i, j}, vx{i,j}) by the hypothesis.
Let R = {i, j}. Then, using the equation xN\R = x
′
N\R, we can show that
vx
′
R = v
x
R. (15)
Indeed, for any T ( R (T 6= ∅), we obtain
vx
′
R (T ) = max{v(T ∪Q)− x
′(Q) | Q ⊆ N \R}
= max{v(T ∪Q)− x(Q) | Q ⊆ N \R}
= vxR(T ),
where the first equality is due to (8) and the second equality follows from
xN\R = x
′
N\R. Also, if T = ∅, then we have v
x′
R (∅) = v
x
R(∅) = 0 by the
definition of vx
′
R (see Definition 5.2). Similarly, for T = R, we can show
vx
′
R (R) = v
x
R(R) as follows:
vx
′
R (R) = v(N)− x
′(N \R)
= v(N)− x(N \R)
= vxR(R).
From the above arguments we obtain (15). Hence we have
x′R ∈ C(R, v
x′
R ) = C(R, v
x
R). (16)
It follows from xj ≥ xi+2 that x
′
R = (xi+1, xj − 1) Lorenz-dominates xR =
(xi, xj), which contradicts xR ∈ LSS(R, v
x
R) (see also Definition 5.1).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have pointed out that the egalitarian solution does not have
nice properties in games with discrete side payment. Then, we have focused
on the Lorenz stable set and shown that it has nice properties such as the
Davis and Maschler reduced game property and the converse reduced game
property. The existence of the egalitarian solution of the core in discrete
convex games is left for the future.
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